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INTRODUCTION
Shareholder suits challenging mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
transactions remain common. Until 2016, they were filed in eighty-five to
ninety-five percent of all deals over $100 million, 1 and evidence suggests
that any downturn since then may have been temporary. 2 The pattern of
these lawsuits is well documented: filings seek injunctive relief and settle
(or, more recently, are mooted) by the defendants’ release of supplemental
disclosures in the merger proxy, on account of which the plaintiffs’
lawyers are entitled to a fee based upon the corporate benefit doctrine. 3
*
T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law. Thanks to Joel Fleming, Claire Hill, Kevin Miller, Anthony Rickey, Scott Rothstein,
and Randall Thomas for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Thanks to Amith Arcot, Julian
Constain, Vanessa Fazzino and Dmytro Usyk for excellent research assistance. All
viewpoints and any errors expressed herein are mine alone.
1.
Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015
(Preliminary Figures) at 2 (Jan. 14, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890.
2.
Matthew D. Cain et al., Mootness Fees, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1777, 1794 (2019)
[hereinafter Cain et al., Mootness Fees] (showing deal litigation back over eighty percent
in 2017 and 2018 after a brief dip to seventy-four percent in 2016). Accord Securities Class
Action Filings:
2018 Year in Review, CORNERSTONE RES. (2019),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2018Year-in-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5M5-SZDV].
3.
Sean J. Griffith, Innovation in Disclosure-Based Shareholder Suits, 69 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 927 (2019) [hereinafter Griffith, Innovation]; Sean J. Griffith & Anthony
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These cases became the bread and butter of the “disclosure bar,” a subclass of plaintiffs’ lawyers that have built business models around
regularly filing and swiftly resolving merger claims. 4
The Delaware Court of Chancery moved definitively against such
suits in January 2016. 5 In re Trulia Stockholder Litigation 6 left no doubt
that disclosure settlements would no longer be welcome in Delaware. 7 In
that case, the Court of Chancery held that “disclosure settlements” would
be met with “disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures
address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission . . . .” 8
This Essay develops a unique dataset to examine the effect of Trulia
on M&A litigation. Rather than examining patterns in merger litigation
filed against public company deals, an empirical strategy followed by
several important papers in this area, 9 I examine the litigation patterns of
repeat play shareholder plaintiffs. I develop an original hand-collected
dataset of litigation filed by seven “frequent filer” shareholder plaintiffs
over a five-year period, 2014 through 2018. 10 During this period, these
plaintiffs filed a total of 282 shareholder suits. In this Essay, I compile data
on their claims, documenting the substantive allegations, procedural form,
and the identity of counsel, as well as the outcomes of claims. I find that
Rickey, Who Collects the Deal Tax, Where, and What Delaware Can Do About It, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 140 (Sean Griffith
et al. eds., 2018); Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder
Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Griffith,
Correcting Corporate Benefit].
4.
Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of
Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 882 (2016).
5.
There had been some prior warning. See, e.g., In re Riverbed Tech. Inc.
Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 241, at *21–22 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 17, 2015) (“If it were not for the reasonable reliance of the parties on formerly settled
practice in this Court, . . . the interests of the Class might merit rejection of a settlement
encompassing a release that goes far beyond the claims asserted and the results achieved.”).
I was a shareholder objector in Riverbed.
6.
129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
7.
Id. at 898. I filed a brief as amicus curiae in Trulia. See Brief of Sean J.
Griffith as Amicus Curiae, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch.
2016) (No. 10020-CB).
8.
In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898 (“In using the term ‘plainly material,’ I mean
that it should not be a close call that the supplemental information is material as that term
is defined under Delaware law.”). As we shall see, Trulia also established a favored
“mootness path” to resolution. See infra Part II.
9.
Cain et al., supra note 2, at 1780 n.14, 1800–03 (discussing the empirical
analysis in Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation:
An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015)).
10.
The phrase “frequent filer” has been used to refer to the lawyers that
regularly bring nuisance litigation on behalf of shareholder plaintiffs. See In re Revlon, Inc.
Shareholders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 943, 943 n.1 (Del. Ch. 2010) (coining the phrase
“frequent filer” to refer to “repeat players who regularly bring representative actions on
behalf of stockholders with small ownership stakes”). Here I use the phrase to refer to the
shareholder plaintiffs themselves rather than the lawyers who file claims on their behalf.
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over my sample period, frequent filer suits transformed from state court
merger challenges based on fiduciary duty into federal court challenges to
disclosure suits based on the federal securities laws. I also find that the
outcomes of these suits transformed from class wide settlements based on
supplemental disclosures (“disclosure settlements”) to mootness
dismissals based on the defendants having corrected the alleged disclosure
deficiencies (“mootness resolutions”). 11 The common denominator
between disclosure settlements and mootness resolutions is that both
entitle plaintiffs’ counsel to collect fees from the corporation while the
plaintiff class receives nothing but disclosures.
I also argue that the evolutionary phases of this litigation are direct
responses to legislative and judicial efforts to contain these suits. Claims
moved from state to federal court to evade state law precedent that had
become hostile to disclosure settlements. Once in federal court, these
claims mutated again, transforming from disclosure settlements into
mootness resolutions in order to avoid judicial scrutiny and the provisions
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the PSLRA). 12
Furthermore, there is evidence of further evolution in these federal
disclosure-based claims. Plaintiffs have now begun to file disclosurebased claims against corporations in contexts other than M&A. And
plaintiffs have begun to file as individuals rather than as a class, apparently
as a further precaution against application of the PSLRA.
I argue that the PSLRA, consistently applied, could address these
problems. The PSLRA bars the award of attorneys’ fees for non-monetary
recoveries. 13 It also requires plaintiffs to meet a high standard of
materiality at pleading, prevents plaintiffs from seeking to represent a class
more than five times in three years, and requires a set of sworn
undertakings by class action claimants. 14 Consistent application of the
PSLRA, however, requires judicial coordination which has so far been
lacking among federal districting courts but which could be achieved
through several mechanisms. Courts should use these mechanisms to
coordinate their response to the problem of merger- and disclosure-related
nuisance suits. Alternatively, repeat-play D&O insurers should incentivize
their corporate insureds to resist disclosure-based shareholder suits.
From this introduction, the Essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes
the empirical methodology employed in this Essay. Part II reports the
findings of my study, discussing filing and outcome characteristics and
11.
See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Time Inc., No. 17-CV-09971, 2018 WL 4177938, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018) (“Sometimes these settlements are characterized as ‘mootness
fees,’ in which the corporation moots the lawsuit by making the allegedly withheld
disclosures, and pays plaintiffs' counsel a "voluntary" fee in return. . . . Such settlements
principally benefit plaintiff's counsel.”) (internal citations omitted).
12.
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4 (2018).
13.
§ 78u–4(a)(6).
14.
§ 78u–4(a)(2).
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providing insights on the relationship between frequent filer plaintiffs and
the disclosure bar. Part III interprets the findings, arguing that they are
evidence of strategic pleading, first to avoid hostile state court precedent
and, second, to avoid application of the PSLRA. Part IV offers
recommendations on how courts can address the problems uncovered in
this chapter. Finally, Part V summarizes and concludes.
I. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
To collect data on the litigation patterns of frequent filer plaintiffs, I
assembled a list of plaintiffs whose names I had frequently encountered in
my own research or litigation activities. 15 I then supplemented my list by
surveying members of the Delaware bench and bar to identify the names
of plaintiffs known to repeatedly file shareholder suits. This produced
seven plaintiffs—Robert Berg, Stephen Bushansky, Natalie Gordon, Paul
Parshall, Matthew Sciabacucci, John Solak, and Shiva Stein—each of
whom has repeatedly been a named shareholder plaintiff in merger
litigation. 16
Next, I searched court dockets for these plaintiffs’ names to assemble
a set of cases in which they had been involved. I restricted my search to
the five-year period spanning the Court of Chancery’s Trulia decision in
January 2016. I searched from January 2014 through year-end 2018. I ran
these searches in Bloomberg Law, an online service that collects docket
information from all federal courts as well as prominent state courts,
including the Delaware Court of Chancery. Within the Bloomberg Law
15.
I have filed objections to disclosure settlements. See, e.g., In re Riverbed,
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041, at *5 nn.16–17 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 17, 2015); Vergiev v. Aguero, L-2276-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 2016);
Griffith v. Quality Distribution, Inc., No. 2D17-3160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 13, 2018);
Stein v. Blankenfein, No. 2017-0354-SG, 2019 WL 2750100 (Del. Ch. July 1, 2019); In re
PMFG, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 11223-VCS (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2016); Bushansky v.
Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742, 750 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 16, 2017); In re Pharmacyclics,
Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 2015-1-CV-278055, 2020 WL 780961 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super.
Ct. July 19, 2016). I have also provided expert testimony in merger litigation. See, e.g.,
Declaration of Sean J. Griffith in Support of Defendants FX Energy, Inc. and Kiwi
Acquisition Corp’s Opposition to Motion for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses,
Richards v. FX Energy, Inc., No. A-15-726409-C (Dist. Ct., Clark County, Nev., June 17,
2016); Corwin v. British Am. Tobacco, No. 14 CVS 8130, 2016 WL 635191 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Feb. 17, 2016); Declaration of Sean J. Griffith in Support of Plaintiffs David D. Essig
and City of Sunrise Police Officer’s Retirement Plan Opposition to Motion for Final
Approval and Objection to the Proposed Settlement, In re Compuware S’holder Litig., 14011437-CB (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne Cty. Sept. 29, 2015); Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns,
Inc., No. 653084/13, 2014 WL 7250212 (NY Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014).
16.
I know nothing about these people other than the fact that their names
regularly appear as named plaintiffs in shareholder litigation. I know nothing about their
motives, nor am I certain that a single person has in fact filed all of the complaints listed
under a single name. It is possible, if highly unlikely, that more than one person sharing
the same name has filed some of these suits.
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dockets database, I searched all federal and state trial court filings
involving any of my seven named plaintiffs. I then sorted these results by
hand, eliminating any suits that did not involve “shareholder litigation,”
which I defined as litigation filed on the basis of the plaintiff’s status as a
shareholder, principally including federal securities law claims and state
fiduciary duty claims. After throwing out unrelated litigation and rejecting
cases where critical docket information, such as the complaint, was
missing and otherwise unattainable, I was left with a sample of 281
shareholder suits filed by these plaintiffs over a five-year period.
With regard to sample construction, some caveats are in order. First,
the list of named plaintiffs for which I searched was informally obtained.
I did not attempt to write a code that would identify all repeat shareholder
plaintiffs who had filed claims in electronically searchable dockets,
although such a search is at least theoretically possible. Instead, I relied on
my own experience and the suggestions of those members of the Delaware
bench and bar that were willing to respond to my queries. As a result, the
sample is not comprehensive. There may be repeat shareholder plaintiffs
whose filings I missed. And the sample may not be representative of the
litigation activity of all repeat play plaintiffs. For example, there may be
other repeat claimants who pursue predominantly meritorious claims, but
if so, they are not the claimants studied here. Nevertheless, I do not claim
that my sample is comprehensive or even, necessarily, representative. My
only claim is that the litigation activity of these seven plaintiffs sheds light
on how some repeat claimants have pursued merger litigation, both before
and after Trulia.
Second, the Bloomberg Law dockets database does not contain all
merger litigation filed in the United States. For the 2014 through 2018 time
period, Bloomberg Law offers comprehensive coverage of federal district
court dockets and, critically, of the Delaware Court of Chancery docket.
However, docket coverage in Bloomberg Law is less exhaustive for other
state trial courts. 17 As a result, filings in Delaware and in federal district
courts may be over-represented in the sample, and filings in other state
courts may be missing. However, Delaware’s predominance as the leading
state of incorporation and the fact that shareholder suits can only be filed
in three places—in the state of incorporation, the headquarters state, or
federal district court—suggest that the predominance of Delaware and
federal court filings is not entirely coincidental.

17.
For details on dockets covered in Bloomberg Law, see Product Help &
Walkthrough: Docket Coverage – U.S. and International, BLOOMBERG L. (2020),
https://help.bloomberglaw.com/docs/blh-040-dockets.html#breaking-complaintsoverview [https://perma.cc/SHG6-ZKFP].
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II. FINDINGS

This Part presents data from my frequent filer dataset. Table 1 below
summarizes the data by category. The subsections following the table
discuss what the data reveal about lawsuit characteristics, outcomes, and
the relationship between frequent filer plaintiffs and the disclosure bar.
Table 1: Summary Data
Type of
Filing

Merger
Derivative
Proxy
Traditional
Securities
Other

2018
43
3
13
0

2017
97
4
15
0

Year
2016
24
4
8
0

2015
25
8
0
4

2014
24
2
0
1

1

2

1

1

1

Forum

Federal
State

52
7

112
6

23
14

12
26

5
23

Outcome

Settlement
Dismissal
Motion

2
51
0

2
106
2

4
25
3

13
9
5

13
5
1

A. Filing Characteristics
Two features jump out of the lawsuit filings in the sample. First, the
vast majority of filings (76%) are merger claims. Second, although the vast
majority of these claims were initially filed in state courts, this trend
shifted dramatically over the sample period. In 2014, 82% of these
plaintiffs’ claims were brought in state courts. In 2015, the percentage of
claims brought in state court fell to 68%, then in 2016, fell even more, to
41%. By 2017 and 2018, the relationship had reversed entirely, with 96%
and 87% of their claims being brought in federal rather than state court.
These relationships are depicted in the figures below.
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Figure 1: Lawsuit Filings by Type of Claim
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Figure 1 breaks plaintiff filings into types of claims. It categorizes
claim types as merger suits, derivative suits, traditional securities class
actions, proxy suits, and other. Merger suits include state law merger
claims as well as federal court filings challenging merger proxy statements
under Rule 14a-9, a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule
applying to misstatements and omissions in the proxy materials of public
companies. 18 Because shareholders may bring class action claims to
enforce Rule 14a-9, merger claims brought under it mirror the disclosure
aspects of state law fiduciary duty claims. Moreover, like state merger
claims, federal claims under Rule 14a-9 can be settled for supplemental
disclosures.
“Proxy suits” are defined to include claims alleging inadequate proxy
statement disclosures under Rule 14a-9 that do not relate to M&A
transactions. The proxy rules require detailed disclosure of a number of
items, including the prior experience and compensation of directors and
officers, details of fees paid to the company’s independent public
accountants, and details concerning stock-based compensation plans. As a
result, shareholders could bring claims alleging disclosure violations
touching any subject on which shareholders are asked to vote. However,
non-merger proxy suits arise most often in compensation-related
disclosures. For example, Item 10(a) of Form S-K requires fairly detailed
disclosure of stock incentive and other compensation plans, including the
number of persons in each class of participants entitled to participate in
the plan. Errors or omissions in such disclosures could thus give rise to
18.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2020).
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14a-9 complaints seeking to enjoin shareholder voting on the plan until
corrective disclosure can be made. As Figure 1 shows, such claims have
become an increasingly common claim pursued by the plaintiffs in my
study. 19
The rest of the categories are fairly obvious. Derivative suits are
fiduciary duty claims filed by individual shareholders seeking redress for
a harm done to the corporation itself. Traditional securities class actions
are claims filed under the sections of the federal securities laws that
shareholder plaintiffs have historically used to seek relief—principally
Rule 10b-5 promulgated under Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. The plaintiffs in my sample filed only five traditional securities
class action filings (three by Stein, one by Sciabacucchi, one by Solak), all
of which allege claims under Rule 10b-5. Finally, Figure 1 includes a
catch-all category for “other” shareholder suits, predominantly including
books and records actions filed under Section 220 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law.
Figure 1 demonstrates that merger claims brought by frequent filer
claimants did not disappear after Trulia. Moreover, the ratio by which
merger suits predominate other shareholder claims increased slightly in
the wake of Trulia. Prior to 2016, the sample contains roughly three
merger suits for every other type of shareholder claim. After 2016, there
are four times as many merger suits as there are other forms of shareholder
suits. In 2016, the year in which Trulia was decided, there were only twice
as many merger suits as there were other types of shareholder filings.
Nevertheless, Figure 1 reveals that the type of suit that accounts for
most non-merger litigation has changed in the wake of Trulia. Proxy suits
challenging non-merger disclosures have largely taken the place of both
derivative suits and traditional securities filings in the sample. These proxy
suits were first filed in 2015 but have become increasingly common since
Trulia. Moreover, they share a critical feature with most merger claims
filed in the wake of Trulia: they are filed in federal court under Rule 14a9 of the federal proxy rules.

19.
Interestingly, however, all but one of the non-merger proxy claims in the
sample were filed by a single litigant, Stein, with the sole remaining non-merger proxy
claim brought by Bushansky.
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Figure 2: Lawsuit Filings by Jurisdiction
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Figure 2 demonstrates what may be the most significant change in
litigation activity in the wake of Trulia. The vast majority of shareholder
suits in the sample are now filed in federal court. As the figure illustrates,
this trend began in earnest in the year prior to Trulia, a time when
Delaware courts began to suggest that they might soon act to restrain
merger litigation. Having brought only two federal claims in 2014 and five
in 2015, all but one of the frequent filers in my sample started filing federal
claims aggressively in 2016. 20 From 2016 through 2018, the remaining six
frequent filers brought 148 federal securities lawsuits. This is consistent
with other researchers’ findings. For example, a Cornerstone study shows
that in 2015, the year before Trulia, thirty-four lawsuits were filed in
federal courts relating to mergers; in 2017, the year after Trulia, there were
198, and in 2018, there were 182. 21
Combining the insights of Figures 1 and 2 reveals that frequent filer
plaintiffs are now bringing merger claims at an even greater rate than they
brought them pre-Trulia. However, they are now bringing these claims in
federal rather than state court, subject to Rule 14a-9 rather than state
corporate law. Moreover, the next most common form of frequent filer suit
from 2015 on, non-merger proxy claims, are also filed federal court cases
under Rule 14a-9. In sum, frequent filer plaintiffs seem to have responded
20.
The exception is Gordon, most of whose claims were brought before 2016
and all of which were brought under state law. See, e.g., Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., No.
10269 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2014); Gordon v. Pepco Holdings, Inc., No. 9612 (Del. Ch. May
5, 2014); Gordon v. Bindra, No. 2:15-cv-01058 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014).
21.
Securities Class Action Filings: 2018 Year in Review, supra note 2, at 14;
see also Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV.
603, 631–32 (2018) [hereinafter Cain et al., Shifting Tides].
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to Trulia by substituting Rule 14a-9 claims for state law merger claims
and, having found their way into federal court under the proxy rules, by
bringing additional proxy claims wherever they could find them.
B. Outcome Characteristics
Docket analysis also reveals a shift in outcomes. To analyze
outcomes, I separated claims that had reached a conclusion into three
categories: settlements, dismissals, and successful defendant motions. At
the beginning of the sample period, settlements strongly predominated
dismissals. In 2014 and 2015, for example, there were two times as many
settlements as dismissals and over four times as many settlements as
successful defendant motions. But this trend reversed sharply in 2016, as
illustrated in Figure 3, below.
Figure 3: Lawsuit Outcomes
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40%
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10%
0%
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It is important to note that the dismissals captured in Figure 3 are not
the result of a motion to dismiss or any other defense-side motion. Such
dispositive motions are coded as “Motions.” Instead, these dismissals are
some form of voluntary dismissal. Most often, these claims are dismissed
because the defendant has taken some action that has the effect of
“mooting” the plaintiffs’ claim, typically by making corrective disclosures
to eliminate the alleged deficiencies of the proxy statement. As shown in
Figure 3, mootness resolutions replaced disclosure settlements, more or
less immediately after Trulia.
From a tactical perspective, mootness resolutions have the benefit of
clearing the way for plaintiffs’ attorneys to recover fees without the risk
inherent in a fairness hearing. Because the defendant has made corrective
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disclosures in response to the compliant, the plaintiff’s attorney is entitled
to recover fees from the defendant under the corporate benefit doctrine. 22
In theory, these fees can be contested by defendants and, if the plaintiff
prevails in a hearing, ordered by the court. In practice, however,
defendants often elect not to oppose fee requests. Figure 3 depicts the
transformation of disclosure settlement into mootness resolutions.
Why would defendants willingly pay plaintiffs’ fees without
receiving the release of claims? Are not defendants who settle for
mootness vulnerable to copycat claims filed by other shareholder plaintiffs
challenging different aspects of disclosure? Again, the answer is in theory,
yes; in practice, no. The corrective disclosures that moot shareholder
claims typically issue very shortly before the shareholder vote. Once the
shareholder vote occurs, the ability to receive a fee award in exchange for
non-pecuniary relief disappears. Plaintiffs may still pursue damages
claims, but in such cases the applicable legal standards are no longer
favorable to plaintiffs. Both sides thus know that once the vote passes, the
hold up value of the plaintiffs’ claim returns to near zero. As a result,
mootness resolutions offer something for the lawyers on both sides. By
waiting until shortly before the vote, defendants minimize the window
available to other potential claimants and, in making the disclosures,
effectively eliminate the potential for an injunction. At the same time,
plaintiffs’ lawyers receive fees averaging $265,000 for claims that they
need scarcely litigate. 23
C. Frequent Filer Plaintiffs and the Disclosure Bar
Docket analysis also reveals patterns in the relationship between
frequent filer plaintiffs and the law firms that bring their claims. Coding
the law firms listed on frequent filer complaints reveals the recurrence of
a core set of plaintiffs’ law firms. This is no surprise. Prior research on
merger litigation has tended to focus on the law firms bringing the most
complaints. 24 Many of the same law firms appear in the frequent filer data
as well—including, for example, Barrack Roddos, Faruqi & Faruqi,
Pomerantz, Rigrodsky & Long, RM Law, WeissLaw, and Wolf
Haldenstein. But starting with the plaintiff rather than the law firm allows
22.
Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit, supra note 3.
23.
Cain et al., Shifting Tides, supra note 21; Cain et al., Mootness Fees, supra
note 2, at 1804.
24.
Adam B. Badawi & David H. Webber, Does the Quality of the Plaintiffs’
Law Firm Matter in Deal Litigation?, 41 J. CORP. L. 359 (2015); Friedlander, supra note
4; Griffith & Rickey, supra note 3; C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Who Are the Top Law Firms?
Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
122 (2015); David H. Webber, Lead Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel in Deal Litigation, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 319, 328–31 (Claire A. Hill & Steven
Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016).
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the lawyer-client relationship to be examined from a different angle,
shedding light on the relationship between the plaintiff and the law firm. 25
What does the data reveal about specific claimants and law firms?
Four of the seven claimants in my study regularly file litigation with the
same law firm. For example, RM Law was involved in twenty-five of
thirty-one of Berg’s filings, WeissLaw was involved in forty-two out of
forty-three of Bushansky’s filings, Faruqi & Faruqi was involved in all of
Gordon’s filings, and Rigrodsky & Long was involved in fifty-seven out
of fifty-nine of Parshall’s filings. These patterns may suggest that it is the
lawyer, not the client, that is the interested party behind most of these
filings. However, the pattern is also not inconsistent with an engaged
plaintiff who has developed a relationship of trust and confidence with a
particular lawyer or law firm.
The remaining three claimants, however, reveal different filing
patterns. For example, fourteen different firms brought Solak’s eighteen
cases. Although many law firms recur in these filings—for example,
Robbins & Arroyo was involved in six Solak cases, Wolf Haldenstein was
involved in four, and Rigrodsky & Long was involved in three—it is
difficult to discern a consistent pattern in the Solak cases. Likewise,
although Rigrodsky & Long was involved in eleven of twenty-one of
Sciabacucchi’s lawsuits, various other law firms were involved in the other
ten. Similarly, Stein’s ninety-six suits were filed by thirty-eight different
combinations of law firms. Three of these recur more frequently than the
others—Wolf Haldenstein (forty-two), Barrack Rodos & Bacine (thirtyeight), and Pomerantz (eighteen)—but it is difficult to discern a consistent
relationship between the plaintiff and a single law firm.
Cross-referencing law firm and claim type, however, reveals further
patterns. As already noted, the vast majority of the claims in my sample
are merger claims. The only other type of claim regularly filed by these
plaintiffs in recent years are proxy suits—that is 14a-9 claims not related
to M&A. There are thirty-six proxy suits in the sample, and as noted
above, thirty-five of them were brought by Stein. Who were the lawyers?
There is greater consistency in the law firms bringing Stein’s proxy
suits than there is among the firms bringing her litigation as a whole. Of
Stein’s thirty-five proxy suits, thirty-three of them were brought by either
Wolf Haldenstein or Barrack Roddos & Racine. In two such cases, both
firms were involved. In contrast, the remainder of Stein’s suits, including
her forty-five merger suits, were brought by an assortment of firms, from
which it is difficult to discern any pattern. This indicates specialization
within the plaintiffs’ bar. These two firms bring claims that other law firms

25.
See generally Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in
Shareholder Litigation, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1089 (2013).
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are not bringing. 26 While it remains unclear whether the plaintiff chooses
the lawyer or the lawyer chooses the plaintiff, it appears to be true that the
type of case makes a difference in the choice.
Finally, if we consider qualitative factors, it is possible to observe that
although the vast majority of these lawsuits end in disclosure settlements
and mootness resolutions, a small number of them were litigated seriously
enough to result in significant pro-plaintiff judicial decisions. Three of
these, both brought by Sciabacucchi, stand out. In the first, Sciabacucchi
v. Liberty Broadband Corp., 27 plaintiffs produced a meaningful doctrinal
development when they successfully argued that a shareholder vote could
be coerced when it involves a choice made “in avoidance of a detriment
created by the structure of the transaction . . . rather than a free choice to
accept or reject the proposition voted on.” 28 In the second, Sciabacucchi
v. Salzberg, 29 plaintiffs succeeded in arguing that forum selection
provisions adopted by Delaware corporations are invalid to the extent that
they require any claim under the Securities Act of 1933 to be filed only in
federal court, a significant and controversial holding both limiting the
scope of forum selection provisions and affirming concurrent state and
federal jurisdiction over Securities Act claims. A third Sciabacucchi case,
In re Tangoe, 30 resulted in a judicial opinion holding the business
judgment rule inapplicable to a merger in light of the inadequacy of
corporate disclosures prior to the shareholder vote. 31 Interestingly, these
three cases were brought by a law firm that filed only five of
Sciabacucchi’s twenty-two claims: Heyman Enerio. 32 The other two
Sciabacucchi claims brought by this firm resulted in significant monetary
recoveries at settlement. 33
The Sciabacucchi cases brought by Heyman Enerio suggest further
specialization. The Heyman Enerio firm was not listed on any other cases
in the dataset, whether filed by Sciabacucchi or any of the six other
26.
The only proxy suit not involving Stein was brought by Bushansky and
involved WeissLaw. Bushansky v. Carlucci, No. 1:17-cv-12091 (D. Mass. Jan. 24, 2019).
27.
No 11418-VCG, 2017 WL 2352152 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017).
28.
Id. at *2.
29.
No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018).
30.
No. 2017-0650-JRS, 2018 WL 6074435 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2018).
31.
Id. (holding Corwin “cleansing” inapplicable in light of inadequate
disclosures).
32.
The firm changed names during the sample period, from Proctor Heyman
Enerio LLP to Heyman Enerio Gattuso & Hirzel LLP. For the sake of brevity, I refer to the
firm by the two names that persisted in each iteration: “Heyman Enerio.” Compare, e.g.,
In re Schawk Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9510 (Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 2014), with Sciabacucci
v. Malone, No. 11418 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2015).
33.
In re Handy & Harman, Ltd. S’holders Litig., No. 2017-882-TMR (Del. Ch.
July 10, 2019) (stating a preliminary settlement for $30 million); In re Pilgrim's Pride
Corp. Deriv. Litig., No. 0058-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24., 2018) (stating a preliminary
settlement of $42.5 million).
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plaintiffs, yet the firm succeeded in litigating or settling the five cases into
which it was brought. This suggests that at least some frequent filer
plaintiffs (or, alternatively, the law firms with the client relationship)
differentiate between high value and low value claims, and for their high
value claims, partner with law firms not otherwise associated with highvolume, low-value litigation.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A basic implication from these findings is that plaintiffs and their
lawyers are highly adaptive. The data demonstrates two significant shifts
in frequent filer claims during the sample period: first, litigants shifted
their claims from state to federal courts at the beginning of 2016. Second,
around the same time, litigants began to shift from settlements to mootness
resolutions. The first of these shifts likely reflects Trulia. The second may
partially reflect federal receptivity to Trulia, but it likely also reflects the
PSLRA.
A. Evading Trulia
As described above, Trulia left no doubt that disclosure settlements
were no longer welcome in Delaware. Settlements would no longer be
certified unless they presented “plainly material” disclosures. 34 The
disclosure bar’s choice was stark: adapt or die.
The response to Trulia was immediate. Merger litigation quickly
shifted to federal court under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.
In 2015, the year before Trulia, there were thirty-four total lawsuits filed
in federal courts relating to mergers; in 2017, the year after Trulia, there
were 198, and in 2018, there were 182. 35 In the years since Trulia, federal
courts have continued to experience high rates of merger-related filings,
with the Third Circuit (which contains Delaware) experiencing the largest
individual portion of this increased volume. 36
Initially, these plaintiffs presented settlements in federal court much
as they had in state court prior to Trulia. But fairness hearings are required
in class settlements, leaving them vulnerable to the risk that federal judges
might refuse to approve settlements for what are effectively nuisance

34.
35.
36.

In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litig., 129 A.3d. 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016).
Securities Class Action Filings: 2018 Year in Review, supra note 2, at 14.
Id.
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suits. 37 For example, in In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litigation, 38 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals referred to disclosure settlements as “no
better than a racket” and expressly adopted Trulia’s “plainly material”
language. 39
In response, the disclosure bar shifted tactics again, this time
converting disclosure settlements to resolutions based on mootness.
Mootness fees avoid judicial scrutiny when, as is often the case,
defendants agree to the plaintiffs’ fee request. Because there is no class
settlement and therefore no class-wide release of claims, there is no
fairness hearing and, often, no further filing other than the notice of
dismissal. Unsurprisingly, once federal judges began to express skepticism
concerning disclosure settlements, plaintiffs shifted to mootness
resolutions. This is now the most common form of merger claim: “In 2018,
[ninety-two percent] of completed deal cases were brought in federal
court. In that same year, in at least [sixty-three percent] of litigated cases,
plaintiffs’ attorneys received a mootness fee.” 40
Mootness resolutions have tactical value to the disclosure bar not only
because they avoid the judicial scrutiny otherwise associated with
settlement. Mootness resolutions are also valuable to the disclosure bar in
federal cases because they enable them to evade potential application of
the PSLRA.
B. Evading the PSLRA
Congress enacted the PSLRA to contain the perceived spread of nonmeritorious securities class actions. Several provisions of the PSLRA are
directly relevant to the 14a-9 claims into which most merger litigation has
now evolved. First, the PSLRA expressly limits attorney’s fees to a
fraction of damages recovered. 41 Hence, if no damages are recovered,
courts cannot award fees from the company. Second, the PSLRA requires
plaintiffs to state with specificity why each alleged misstatement or
omission is materially misleading. 42 Third, the PSLRA requires plaintiffs
37.
See William B. Rubenstein, The Fariness Hearing: Adversarial and
Regulatory Appraoches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1467–68 (2006) (explaining that because
the release of claims provided in connection with class settlements affects the rights of
absent class members, courts must approve the fairness of the settlement).
38.
832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016).
39.
Id. at 724–25. The Seventh Circuit has since doubled down on Walgreen,
recognizing the “racket” of non-meritorious class action filings in contexts other than
merger litigation. In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Litig., 869 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir.
2017) (“A class action that ‘seeks only worthless benefits for the class’ and ‘yields [only]
fees for class counsel’ is ‘no better than a racket’ and ‘should be dismissed out of hand.’”).
40.
Cain et al., Mootness Fees, supra note 2, at 1782.
41.
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(6) (2018).
42.
§ 78u–4(b)(1).
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to identify, at the time of filing, other securities claims filed during the
prior three years “in which the plaintiff has sought to serve as a
representative party on behalf of a class.” 43 Fourth, the PSLRA bars any
plaintiff from leading more than five securities class actions in any threeyear period. 44 Fifth, and finally, the PSLRA requires courts to make Rule
11 findings with regard to any “complaint, responsive pleading, or
dispositive motion” filed by plaintiffs’ attorneys. 45 These provisions
would seem to substantively impede the proliferation of merger-related
nuisance claims in federal court. However, each of these requirements has
a different trigger—some are triggered upon filing, some upon class
certification, others upon final adjudication. This provides plaintiffs with
an opportunity to avoid them through strategic pleading.
First, with regard to the provision limiting attorneys’ fees to a fraction
of damages, the PSLRA states that: “Total attorneys’ fees and expenses
awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a
reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment
interest actually paid to the class.” 46 Because no damages or prejudgment
interest are paid to the class in a disclosure settlement or a mootness
resolution, a straightforward reading of the plain text of this provision,
uncontradicted by the legislative history, bars courts from awarding
attorneys’ fees in such cases. 47 Although some district courts have
hesitated to accept this reading of the statutory text, 48 others have adopted
it. 49
43.
§ 78u–4(a)(2)(A)(v). The certification also requires the plaintiff to commit
not to accept any payment in connection with the litigation other than her pro rata share of
any recovery, except as approved by the court. § 78u–4(a)(2)(A)(vi).
44.
§ 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(vi).
45.
§ 78u–4(c)(1).
46.
§ 78u–4(a)(6).
47.
An alternative interpretation—that Congress intended only to limit
attorneys’ fees to a reasonable percentage of damages when damages are paid, not to ban
fee awards for non-pecuniary relief—imports assumed meanings into otherwise
unambiguous statutory text and is, in any event, unsupported by legislative history. Courts
in other jurisdictions have read parallel statutes to bar non-pecuniary relief in class action
settlements. See, e.g., Kazman v. Frontier Oil Corp., 398 S.W.3d 377, 387 (Tex. Ct. App.
2013).
48.
See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Conference at 48, Taxman v. Covidien
PLC, No. 1-14-cv-12949-LTS (D. Mass. Oct. 2, 2015) (“[I]t is an awful lot of weight to
read on that one sentence, that Congress rewrote the common benefit rule with respect to
federal securities litigation in that sort of backhanded way, rather than directly. . . . I don't
read the language quite as powerfully as you do.”).
49.
See Franchi v. Bay Bancorp, Inc., No. GLR-17-3699, 2018 WL 8415675, at
*2 (D. Md. Oct. 25, 2018) (holding that because the plaintiff’s complaint was filed under
the Exchange Act and was mooted by defendant’s supplemental disclosures, resulting in
“no monetary benefit [to plaintiff] or the putative class. . . . [plaintiff] and the putative class
are not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.”); see also Mostaed v. Crawford, Nos. 3:11cv-00079-JAG, 3:11-cv-00082-JAG, 2012 WL 3947978, at *7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2012)
(“[P]laintiffs must be denied attorneys’ fees because the [PSLRA] amended the [Exchange
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On its face, this provision applies only to fees “awarded by the court.”
This applies most obviously to settlements. As discussed above, fees paid
in most mootness resolutions are privately negotiated between plaintiffs
and defense counsel. 50 Hence, no court award. However, should a
defendant contest a fee request, the only way for plaintiffs’ counsel to be
paid would be for the fee to be awarded by a court on the basis of the
attorneys’ efforts on behalf of the class. In this case, the PSLRA would
appear to apply. As a result, an attorney petitioning for fees based upon
her efforts in a class-based claim is asking for something the PSLRA bars
the court from awarding. 51
Nevertheless, a route around the PSRLA’s ban on fees for nonmonetary relief remains. This provision, like many provisions of the
PSLRA, depends upon the existence of a class. The provision applies to
fees awarded “to counsel for the plaintiff class.” 52 Whether settled or
resolved for mootness, when claims are filed as class actions and assert a
right to recovery on that basis, any fee award derives from the existence
of a class claim and should therefore be covered under the PSLRA. But
individual claims—that is, claims filed by a plaintiff in her individual
capacity not claiming to represent a class—would seem to evade this
provision. Indeed, the provisions of the PSLRA are generally applicable
to “each private action arising under [the federal securities laws] . . .
brought as a plaintiff class action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.” 53 By negative inference, it is not applicable to individual
actions.
Perhaps following this logic, a pattern of filing 14a-9 claims as
individual rather than class actions has begun to emerge in my frequent
filer data. The first individual (rather than class or derivative) complaint
filed by a plaintiff in my dataset appeared in 2015, with the number of
such claims steadily increasing each year: seven in 2016, fourteen in 2017,
and twenty-two in 2018. Apart from being filed as individual complaints,
with no reference to a class, these complaints are otherwise
indistinguishable from class action claims. The only meaningful
difference is that as non-class filings, they are not subject to the PSLRA.
Other provisions of the PSLRA can also be evaded even more easily,
either by filing as a class but never seeking certification, or instead, by
Act] to prevent the award of attorneys’ fees except where counsel’s efforts have led to
monetary relief that is ‘actually paid to the class’ of claimants.”); In re Microstrategy, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 172 F. Supp. 2d 778, 784–85 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that the PSLRA operates
as a “limitation on the fees and expenses awarded by a court”).
50.
See supra notes 40, 46–47 and accompanying text.
51.
Franchi, 2018 WL 8415675, at *2. See also Mostaed, 2012 WL 3947978, at
*7 (holding “federal law clearly precludes” attorneys’ fees when plaintiffs have not
received a monetary judgment).
52.
15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(6) (2018).
53.
§ 78u–4(a)(1).
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filing individual actions. For example the provision requiring courts to
make Rule 11 findings is triggered by “final adjudication of the action.” 54
In the case of mootness resolutions, therefore, Rule 11 findings are not
required because courts do not treat voluntary dismissals, with or without
prejudice, as “final adjudication.” 55 Likewise, the PSLRA’s presumptive
prohibition against leading more than five class actions in a three-year
period may only apply at class certification, when lead plaintiffs are
actually appointing. Nevertheless, there is at least an argument that a
plaintiff seeks to lead a class action when she files a class complaint and
that therefore the presumptive ban should be interpreted to apply at filing,
not only at certification.
The PSLRA’s pleading and certification requirements, however, are
clearly applicable at the time of filing. 56 Plaintiffs therefore cannot avoid
the requirement that they plead with specificity by seeking a mootness
resolution. Applied strictly, this requirement would force plaintiffs to
articulate precisely why specific misstatements or omissions make the
proxy materially misleading. Pleading with specificity means not merely
claiming, as plaintiffs often do, that disclosure is good, and more is better.
Rather, it means stating precisely why each claimed omission—such as
non-GAAP financial measures left out of the summary of the fairness
opinion—makes the proxy statement materially misleading. For example,
a federal court recently abrogated a disclosure-based mootness resolution
on the basis of the materiality of the disclosures alleged in the complaint. 57
Holding that the proper inquiry was the materiality of the alleged
disclosure deficiencies, not the corrective disclosures made by defendant
subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the court found that none of the
alleged disclosures met the standard of materiality and should therefore
have been “dismissed out of hand.” 58
Likewise, the PSLRA’s certification requirement applies at filing,
irrespective of class certification. 59 Pursuant to this requirement, plaintiffs
must certify that they are “willing to serve as a representative party on
behalf of a class” and disclose the number of actions “in which the plaintiff
has sought to serve as a representative party on behalf of a class” in the

54.
§ 78u–4(c)(1).
55.
Rosenfeld v. Time Inc., No. 17-CV-09971, 2018 WL 4177938, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018); Blaser v. Bessemer Trust Co., N.A., No. 01cv11599 (DLC),
2002 WL 31359015, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002); Unite Here v. Cintas Corp., 500 F.
Supp. 2d. 332, 336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Manchester Mgmt. Co. v. Echo
Therapeutics, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 451, 465–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (collecting cases).
56.
§§ 78u–4(a)(2)(A), (c)(1)–(3)(A).
57.
House v. Akorn, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 616 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
58.
Id. at 619.
59.
§ 78u–4(a)(2)(A) (applicable to “[e]ach plaintiff seeking to serve as a
representative party on behalf of a class”).
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last three years. 60 Because a plaintiff seeks to represent a class every time
she files a class action, mootness claims filed as class actions therefore
cannot evade the certification requirement.
The plaintiff’s filing of the undertakings required in the certification
creates an opening for further judicial inquiry into the adequacy of the
plaintiff and her counsel. For example, if a plaintiff disclosed that she had
filed multiple representative actions during that period, the court could ask
additional questions, such as:
• What results were obtained by the plaintiff in her
representative actions filed over the past three years?
• Has plaintiff’s counsel filed other representative actions on
behalf of other plaintiffs over the same period? If so, what
were the results obtained in these actions?
Such questions would reveal whether the plaintiff was a frequent filer
and unmask her counsel as a member of the disclosure bar. The court may
also inquire into the relationship between the named plaintiff and
plaintiff’s counsel. Are there financial or familial relationships that
suggest the named plaintiff may be an inadequate monitor of class
counsel? Federal courts have authority to inquire into these matters under
Rule 23(a)(4), which requires the court to determine whether “the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.” 61 If the court is troubled by what it finds, it might inquire further:
• Is the plaintiff willing to provide the putative class with
notice and an opportunity to object to any resolution of the
claim?
• Would the parties consent to the judicial appointment of an
amicus to evaluate the materiality of the allegations in the
complaint, with such costs to be taxed to the parties?
The point here is that courts can and should use the certification
requirement as an opening to seek further undertakings and commitments
from the parties in order to safeguard the interests of the putative class.
However, like the bar on attorneys’ fees for non-pecuniary relief, the
certification and pleading requirements can be avoided by filing
individual, rather than class actions. The PSLRA applies to litigation in
which a plaintiff has either been certified as a class representative or files
a claim seeking class certification. 62 Individual actions are neither of those
things. It would therefore seem that plaintiffs can avoid the PSLRA by
filing individual actions and resolving them for mootness. How the law
should respond to these tactics is the subject of the next section.

60.
61.

§ 78u–4(a)(2)(A)(iii)–(v).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).

62.

§ 78u–4(a).

462

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The PSLRA ought to stop the flood of merger-related nuisance
litigation into federal court and reverse the flow back into state courts. Not
only does the PSLRA bar the award of attorneys’ fees for non-monetary
recoveries, it also requires plaintiffs to meet a high standard of materiality
at pleading, prevents plaintiffs from seeking to represent a class more than
five times in three years, and requires sworn undertakings by class action
claimants. 63 Recognizing their inability to recover fees in federal court,
plaintiffs’ lawyers would move their cases back to state court, where even
if the salad days of disclosure settlements are over, courts remain receptive
to awarding attorneys’ fees based on mootness resolutions. 64
Why, then, has this not happened? The obvious answer is that the
PSLRA is not applied consistently. Indeed, that six plaintiffs brought 148
securities lawsuits over a three-year period when the PSLRA would have
limited them to a maximum of thirty suggests that the statute is often not
applied at all. 65 But why is that?
This Part argues that three parties are to blame for the inconsistent
application of the PSLRA: plaintiffs, defendants, and judges. First,
plaintiffs thwart the PSLRA by pleading strategically. Second, defendants
frustrate the PSLRA because they so frequently acquiesce to paying
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees rather than contesting them. Third, judges have
been unable (or unwilling) to coalesce around a single interpretation of the
PSLRA and a coherent approach to mootness resolutions. In the sections
below, I sketch these problems and offer solutions to each, noting the
obstacles that remain.
A. Prevent Strategic Pleading by Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs plead strategically to avoid application of the PSLRA. By
aiming for mootness resolutions rather than disclosure settlements, they
are able to avoid class certification and “final adjudication.” Furthermore,
63.
§ 78u–4(a)(2); see also Sean J. Griffith, Class Action Nuisance Suits:
Evidence from Frequent Filer Shareholder Plaintiffs 4 (European Corp. Governance
Institute,
Working
Paper
No.
502,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3470330.
64.
Indeed, Trulia suggested that mootness was the “preferred scenario” for
resolving disclosure-based claims. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 897
(Del. Ch. 2016). Moreover, subsequent decisions in Delaware have suggested a lower
standard of materiality for awarding mootness fees as opposed to disclosure settlements.
See In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at
*10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016) (awarding a $50,000 mootness fee for “disclosure provid[ing]
some benefit to stockholders, whether or not material”). Under the circumstances, plaintiffs
seem to have stayed away given Delaware’s tendency to award mid five-figure fees rather
than the low six-figure fees now common in federal court.
65.
See discussion of Figure 2 supra Part II.A.
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by filing individual rather than class actions, they are able to avoid any
risk that the PSLRA will be applied to them. Consistent with this account,
I found that the plaintiffs in my sample increasingly filed 14a-9 claims as
individual rather than class actions. Courts should respond to this trend by
refusing to award attorneys’ fees to individual claimants based on the
value of class-wide relief and instead award fees, if at all, only on the basis
of the named plaintiff’s proportional share of the benefit. Awarding fees
to individual claimants based on class-wide relief is unsupported by
doctrine and inconsistent with fundamental norms of equity.
Underlying both the common fund doctrine, under which courts
award attorneys’ fees for monetary recoveries, and the corporate benefit
doctrine, under which courts award fees for non-monetary recoveries, is a
principle of fee-sharing. 66 Under both doctrines, the attorney is awarded
by the class of beneficiaries on the basis of the benefit they share. This is
most apparent when the attorney’s fee is taken from the monetary recovery
to be shared by the class. But the principle also operates in derivative suits
and class actions when attorneys’ fees for non-monetary benefits are
assessed against the corporation. In the derivative suit context, the
corporation is the legal plaintiff and therefore the attorney’s client, thus
justifying the assessment of fees against it. In the context of a certified
class, assessing fees against the corporation is justified by the fact that,
through certification of the class and appointment of lead counsel, the
attorney is made the legal representative of all shareholders. Because the
corporation is an asset of all shareholders, assessing fees against the
corporation ensures that they are shared by the class of beneficiaries
represented by the attorney.
There is no equivalent basis for fee-sharing when the plaintiff files an
individual suit rather than a class action. When plaintiffs’ lawyers bring
individual actions, their client is the named plaintiff and no one else. Just
as any monetary recovery from the suit would belong exclusively to the
named plaintiff, not the corporation (as in a derivative suit) or all
shareholders (as in a class action), the common fund doctrine does not
apply, and attorneys’ fees must be recovered from the named plaintiff.
Likewise, in the absence of a derivative suit or a certified class, there is no
legal basis for fee-sharing. In an individual action, the attorney does not
represent the corporation or all shareholders as a class. Assessing
attorneys’ fees against the corporation in the context of an individual
action therefore amounts to fee-shifting, not fee-sharing. Fee-shifting is
not supported by either the common fund or corporate benefit doctrines.67
A logically consistent approach to attorneys’ fees for individual
actions would limit an attorney’s fees in such cases to her client’s
proportional interest in the class-wide benefit. Outside of the context of
66.
67.

Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit, supra note 3, at 37–41.
See id. at 38–41.
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derivative suits and certified class actions, courts should not award fees on
the basis of class-wide benefits. Instead, the attorney should be awarded a
sum based on the value the disclosure achieves for the specific named
plaintiff. So, if, for example, a shareholder plaintiff has 0.0001% of the
common stock of a company, the proportionality principle implies that the
plaintiffs’ attorney should receive a fee no greater than 0.0001% of the
value of the class-wide benefit. Thus, assuming the total aggregate value
of a highly material supplemental disclosure is $500,000, a court should
award plaintiffs’ counsel no more than $50 in fees.
This does not mean that attorneys cannot be compensated for having
achieved class-wide relief. It means only that if they wish to recover fees
on that basis, then they must do so under one of the two recognized
procedural methods for doing so. They must file either a derivative suit or
a class action. The derivative suit is the traditional vehicle for obtaining
equitable or injunctive relief—benefits such as the prevention of an
unlawfully convened meeting or reversal of an ultra vires action—from a
corporation, but such benefits may also be achieved through class actions.
Indeed, the history of merger litigation pre-Trulia typically involved state
fiduciary duty suits brought as class actions. 68
The distinction between class and derivative actions, on the one hand,
and individual complaints, on the other, is not a procedural peccadillo.
Both the class and derivative suit contain substantive mechanisms to
prevent abuse. Foremost among these in the derivative suit context is the
demand requirement, which prevents individual plaintiffs from bringing
representative litigation to which the board of directors objects. 69 The
theory here is that shareholders already have representatives (the board),
and unless these representatives harbor some conflict of interest, they are
the ones to determine whether the lawsuit is in the interests of all
shareholders. Likewise, certification provides important protections for
class members. Class certification provides a mechanism for shareholders
to object to the appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel. Class
certification also creates mechanisms for class members to opt out of the
representation or object to the outcome. Finally, securities class actions
trigger the additional protections of the PSLRA reviewed above.
Individual actions provide no such protections. When an individual
action is resolved for mootness, there is no opportunity for other
shareholders to object to either the benefit or to the fees. As non-parties to
the dispute, they have no standing to intervene. Attributing benefits and
taxing fees to them thus amounts to an imposition of outcome and a
68.
Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder
Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 167, 181–82
(2004).
69.
TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES THE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 28–29 (2010).
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shifting of fees without giving them any choice in the matter. Not only is
this contrary to the procedural requirements of Rule 23, more
fundamentally it is contrary to basic norms of equity to appoint a de facto
shareholder representative in a process that denies shareholders the
opportunity to question the appointment, to contest the adequacy of the
representative, and to object to the value of the resulting relief. Treating
individual actions as the equivalent of representative actions lets a single
plaintiff speak for a corporation’s entire shareholder base when no one—
no court, no corporation, and no shareholder—has evaluated that
shareholder’s adequacy as a representative or inquired into her
motivations.
Another way of seeing this is through the lens of litigation agency
costs. Representative actions—class and derivative suits—contain
mechanisms for ensuring that the agent (the attorney) remains accountable
to the principal (the shareholders). Individual actions, because the attorney
is assumed to be directly accountable to her client, do not. Allowing
attorneys to recover representative fees for filing individual actions avoids
these mechanisms and renders the lawyers wholly unaccountable to the
broader interests attributed to them. It would not be surprising if such
unconstrained agents represented no one but themselves.
Courts should therefore refuse to award representative fees to
attorneys that file individual actions. Awarding class-based attorneys’ fees
to individual claimants is inconsistent with fundamental principles of
fairness and unsupported by the theory underlying both the common fund
and corporate benefit doctrines. If courts consistently refused to award
representative fees for individual actions, plaintiffs could still file
individual claims. And some large institutional investors probably would
do so. But most individuals probably would not, simply because they are
likely unwilling to pay their lawyers directly and their lawyers, unable to
recover fees from the corporation, would likely be unwilling to take the
case. Instead, the lawyers would channel such claims back into class or
derivative suit filings—a salutary result since class and derivative claims,
unlike individual suits, contain mechanisms for ensuring the
accountability of the attorney-agent to the interests of the shareholder
class.
B. Motivate Defendants to Resist
All of the above focuses on the judicial award of fees. However, as
already noted, most merger suits today are not resolved with a judicial
award of fees, but rather with the corporate defendant acquiescing to pay
the plaintiffs’ attorneys based on mootness. How, then, does clarifying the
basis on which fees may and may not be awarded by courts affect a system
in which fees are not collected by judicial order? Even if courts could not
award class-based fees for individual filings, claimants could still file
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individual actions and resolve them for mootness fees without involving a
court. Alternatively, plaintiffs might not even file a complaint at all, but
simply send defendants a letter threatening to do so unless they moot their
concerns and acquiesce to paying them a fee for their troubles.
Considering their willingness to pay rather than fight, defendants appear
to be complicit in this arrangement, which explains why the strongest
arguments under the PSLRA are so rarely raised. How, then, does a reform
focusing on the judicial award of fees respond to a world in which fees are
often paid without ever being awarded by a court?
The answer lies in the notion that all bargaining takes place in the
shadow of the law. 70 What parties agree to do privately depends upon what
they may be ordered to do publicly. Applied here, this means that the
amount that judges can reasonably be expected to award in a contested fee
application sets a ceiling on plaintiffs’ ability to claim fees from the
defendant. As a result, plaintiffs’ inability to recover fees in court should
reduce or even eliminate defendants’ willingness to pay them in private
negotiations.
In addition to the legal merits, a second contributing factor to
settlement value is the cost of deciding a claim. If the process for
determining a claim’s value is long and costly, it may have positive
settlement value without regard to its underlying legal merit. Thus, even if
plaintiffs’ attorneys are not entitled to a judicial award of fees, they may
nevertheless be able to extract fees from the defendant up to the cost of
litigating the claim.
A clear means of addressing these costs is for defendants to credibly
commit not to pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in nuisance suits. If
defendants did not pay, plaintiffs would not bring claims for hold-up value.
The situation has the structure of a collective action problem: all
defendants would prefer that no defendants pay fees to hold-up plaintiffs,
but individual defendants would generally prefer to pay fees to get out of
their own claim. Defendants cannot coordinate. Therefore, defendants
cannot credibly commit.
There is, however, a repeat-play defendant behind the settlement of
every claim: the D&O insurer. 71 Insurers could insist that their corporate
insureds refuse to pay mootness fees, either ex post by litigating cases to
the motion to dismiss, or ex ante by adopting “no-pay” bylaws that

70.
See generally Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (explaining that when
courts encourage private bargaining between parties, bargaining occurs in the shadow of
the law).
71.
See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 69, at 2–3 (observing that virtually all
public companies carry D&O insurance and examining how D&O insurers change
corporate incentives in governance and litigation).
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preclude them from paying attorneys’ fees in nuisance suits. 72 Because
insurers play the bank in shareholder litigation, funding the conduct of
litigation and settlements under the terms of the D&O policy, they have
strong incentives to eliminate waste from the system. Moreover, they
could motivate defendants by providing incentives (for example, by
offering to pay litigation expenses in excess of limits) to policyholders for
litigating the motion to dismiss or adopt no-pay bylaws. Moreover,
litigation would not be necessary in every case but likely only a handful
of cases, since once the credible commitment mechanism was established,
plaintiffs would likely no longer waste their own resources on nonmeritorious suits.
C. Coordinate the Judicial Response
In a prior co-authored article, I argued that the problem of mergerrelated nuisance suits would be solved by moving this litigation into
federal court. 73 My co-authors and I reasoned, consistent with the
arguments above, that such claims would not survive an encounter with
the PSLRA. 74 Since the publication of that article, however, Trulia solved
the problem in Delaware, yet merger-related nuisance litigation continues,
largely unabated, in federal court.
Our mistake lay in failing to account for differences in the
organizational structure of the Delaware judiciary, on the one hand, and
the federal judiciary, on the other. These differences give Delaware an
advantage over the federal courts in responding to perceived litigation
excesses. Most notably, in Delaware, a single court, the Court of
Chancery, hears all corporate law cases, and although the judges on that
court sit individually, the court has only seven (then five) members.
Moreover, because the members of the Court of Chancery hear so many
related cases and regularly meet to discuss them, it is relatively easy for
the court to design a coherent and consistent approach to recurring issues
or, as in the case of disclosure-based merger litigation, systemic problems.
The federal judiciary, by contrast, consists of approximately 650
district court judges scattered across the country. 75 They do not specialize
in a particular type of case. Moreover, in spite of the relatively large
number of 14a-9 claims filed in federal district courts, individual judges
72.
Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No-Pay Provisions Can
Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN
CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 292, 304–307 (Steven Davidoff Solomon &
Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (explaining how no-pay bylaws could solve the
nuisance suit problem).
73.
Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015).
74.
Id. at 608–12.
75.
KAREN E. HAYDEN, SOCIETY AND LAW 89 (2020).
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are not especially likely to be assigned one and may rarely encounter
securities class actions during their entire career on the bench. Most
federal judges do not have a background in corporate or securities law and
are therefore unlikely to be familiar with the operation of the PSRLA or
the policy issues surrounding it. 76 They do not generally meet to
coordinate their approach on issues and are not bound to follow other
district court rulings even within the same circuit. Although district courts
are bound to follow the rulings of their Circuit Court of Appeals, rulings
in merger-related nuisance suits are rarely appealed. For this reason,
binding appellate precedent is largely absent in this area—the notable
exception being the Seventh Circuit 77—leaving federal district courts
largely uncoordinated and unconstrained.
Additionally, federal judges are likely to be operating in an
informational vacuum when the 14a-9 claims they have been assigned are
resolved for mootness. Judges operating in an adversarial system, as
opposed to an inquisitorial system, rely on the parties to inform them of
relevant legal issues. However, unless the defendant contests the fee, there
is no adversarial process before the judge in a mootness resolution. As a
result, neither the requirements of the PSLRA, nor any other serious issue,
such as the filing of individual as opposed to class actions, is raised to the
judge. Only a highly motivated judge thoroughly steeped in corporate and
securities law issues is likely to raise concerns sua sponte. Moreover,
district court judges have a history of disregarding the PSLRA, even when
the terms of the statute require them to act—for example, by requiring
certified undertakings or making Rule 11 filings. 78 When, as in the case of
a mootness resolution, the parties have arranged for the discrete
disappearance of their dispute, judges are unlikely to intervene to prevent
the removal of a case from their docket.
As a result, it is somewhat naïve to expect individual federal judges
to solve the problem of merger-related nuisance suits. 79 Were one federal
district court judge to read the PSLRA and apply it as written, there would
76.
Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud
Opinions, 51 EMORY L.J. 83, 85–86 (2002).
77.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
78.
Todd Henderson & William H.J. Hubbard, Judicial Noncompliance with
Mandatory Procedural Rules Under the PSLRA, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S87 (2015).
79.
My former co-authors have doubled down on this approach in a new paper,
advocating amendments to FRCP 23 to require mootness awards to be approved by a
federal district court judge. Cain et al., Mootness Fees, supra note 2, at 1805, 1810–14.
However, without some means of coordinating the judiciary, such an approach essentially
creates a lottery in which success depends largely upon the judge one draws, the same basic
system that prevailed in disclosure settlements pre-Trulia. Marianna Wonder, The
Changing Odds of the Chancery Lottery, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2381 (2016). A simpler and
more promising approach, I argue, lies in coordinating the federal judiciary around
consistent application of the PSLRA.
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still be 649 or so that might not. 80 In order for federal courts to solve the
nuisance suit problem rather than exacerbating it, there must be a
coordination mechanism around which federal district courts can organize
a unified approach to 14a-9 filings and application of the PSLRA to them.
Fortunately, coordination mechanisms exist.
The Federal Judicial Conference (the “Conference”) consists of
representatives from all levels of the federal judiciary and, through its
standing and advisory committees, develops judicial policy for U.S.
courts. 81 The Conference could and should consider changes to procedural
rules to develop a coherent and coordinated approach to merger- and
disclosure-related litigation filed in federal courts. Specifically, the
Conference should adopt a rule precluding judges from awarding
attorneys’ fees based on class-wide benefits for filing individual actions.
Fees based on class-wide benefits should only be available to attorneys
filing class or derivative actions. Furthermore, the Conference could and
should require federal district court judges to apply the provisions of the
PSLRA to all securities class action filings.
In addition to the Conference, the Federal Judicial Center (the
“Center”) offers educational programming to federal judges on various
substantive and procedural matters. 82 The Center could and should design
educational programming around the trends in merger-related nuisance
suits described in this Essay. It should also design educational
programming about the provisions of the PSLRA and their applicability to
these suits.
Coordination through the Conference and the Center would enable
the federal judiciary to develop a unified approach to what has become a
systemic problem. Merger- and disclosure-related claims filed under the
federal securities laws and the mootness-based resolutions that accompany
them are problematic not only because they impose a meaningless tax on
corporations and their investors, but because the easy availability of feebased resolutions may disincentivize attorneys from investing in cases of
legitimate wrongdoing. And taxing fees and costs to corporations without
giving the shareholders an opportunity to opt-out or object is
fundamentally inequitable and deprives them of statutory rights under
Rule 23 and the provisions of the PSLRA.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has examined the problem of merger-related nuisance
suits. It has supplied empirical evidence from a dataset of frequent filer
80.
One is an exaggeration. There are at least three. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
81.
28 U.S.C. § 331 (2018) (creating the Federal Judicial Conference).
82.
§ 620 (creating the Federal Judicial Center).
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plaintiffs, finding that over a five-year period seven individual plaintiffs
filed 282 shareholder suits. Analysis of these filings reveals that they have
been designed strategically to avoid hostile state court precedent as well
as application of the PSRLA. The most recent innovation along these lines
appears to be filing of individual rather than class-based complaints.
Federal courts already have the means, through the PSLRA, to correct
these problems. However, doing so requires coordination. Fortunately,
coordination mechanisms exist. The Federal Judicial Conference and the
Federal Judicial Center should be used to develop a unified approach to
stop the flood of merger-related nuisance litigation.

